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INTRODUCTION 
Research consistently demonstrates that males–beginning when they are 
just young boys–externalize oppositional behavior to a markedly higher 
degree than females.  In a school setting, this typically translates to male 
students being disciplined for even marginally unacceptable behavior more 
frequently, including frequent loss of educational days due to out-of-school 
suspensions.  It should come as no surprise that these same students 
sometimes resort to aggressive, perhaps even violent, behavior.  Yet it is 
likely that many of these same male students have identified disabilities 
under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1, with 
                                                          
 1. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. §1401(3)(A)(i) 
(2018) (identifying 13 disability categories; one is serious emotional disturbance); See 
also 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1) (2017). 
2
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Individualized Education Programs that can be personalized with sound, 
peer-reviewed behavioral services that can make a real difference. 
Strengthening IDEA’s behavior provisions could reverse the trend for 
these students–who demonstrate much higher percentages of engagement 
with law enforcement or discipline than students not covered by IDEA.2  For 
example, students with identified disabilities under IDEA constituted 12 
percent of all public school students in 2015-2016, but were referred to law 
enforcement or experienced school-related arrests at a rate of 28 percent.3  
This contrasts markedly with students without disabilities who had a lower 
percentage of those referrals relative to their enrollment.4 
Behavior–and its impact on educational outcomes and eventually society–
remains the forgotten child in efforts to meet the needs of these most 
emotionally vulnerable students.  There is no hope that Congress–long 
overdue in reauthorizing IDEA–will even begin hearings or consider 
reauthorizing the statute in the future.  This lack of direction from the federal 
law creates an unhealthy tension, with the current behavior provisions in 
IDEA much too limited either to serve our students or to inform educational 
practice.  Both limitations have undesirable effects, resulting in unequal 
treatment of students and school districts being left in the dark about how to 
meet the legal requirements—often triggering expulsions for students and 
expensive litigation for the districts. 
While states could remedy this problem, most do not.  Currently, less than 
half of states define requirements beyond the superficial; the majority simply 
rely on the bare-bones IDEA language.  This minimal approach to serious 
behavioral problems has reached a critical mass.  Even the federal circuit 
courts are not in agreement with what is required, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not considered a case focusing on the IDEA behavior provisions 
since Honig v. Doe thirty years ago.5 
                                                          
 2. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL CLIMATE AND 
SAFETY (2018) (reporting data collected from 2015-2016 and stating that “the effects 
these school discipline policies have had on special needs students–what is referred to as 
the school-to-prison pipeline—contributed to Congress’s revision of IDEA in 
1997 . . . .”); see also Stephanie M. Poucher, Comment, The Road to Prison is Paved 
with Bad Evaluations: The Case for Functional Behavioral Assessments and Behavior 
Intervention Plans, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 471, 479 (2015). 
 3. Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., A First Look: Key Data Highlights 
on Equity and Opportunity Gaps in Our Nation’s Public Schools 3-4, 13 (2016) (showing 
the consistency of this disparity over time and the disparities that exist similarly between 
male students and African-American students). 
 4. See Poucher, supra note 2, at 479. 
 5. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988) (declining “to infer a dangerousness 
3
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In an era when the federal government is moving to deregulate many 
industries–education among them–it is critical for legislatures to clarify and 
expand the requirements in the behavior provisions of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act.  Moving toward that goal will benefit individual 
students and all children in our public schools.  The IDEA provides little or 
no guidance on how to approach these most sensitive of issues in the 
education setting.  In short, the behavioral provisions of IDEA are not much 
more than a concept, which emphasize only those instances where a student 
has a change of placement of ten days or more, and as part of the 
consideration of special factors when the Individualized Education Program 
(IEP) team is developing the student’s program.6 
This Article examines current law and proposes constructive change to 
deal with inequities for students with behavior challenges.  Part I reviews the 
behavior provisions in IDEA.  Part II focuses on state statutes and rules, 
identifying which states have taken the lead and determining where the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia7 fall–whether they add language 
enhancing the requirements that the Local Education Agencies8 must meet 
or simply rely on federal law (either with no state statutory provisions or 
duplicating some or all of the federal language).  Part III analyzes similarities 
and differences in appellate court decisions of the eleven federal circuits 
from 2011 through 2016, when a major issue included a factual or legal 
determination of the Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA) and Behavior 
Intervention Program (BIP) requirements.  Finally, Part IV summarizes the 
impact on these forgotten children of IDEA, and recommends an approach 
                                                          
exception” under IDEA and removing authority in most cases from schools who wished 
to unilaterally remove a student for indeterminate periods of time due to behaviors). 
 6. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)-(G) 
(2018). 
 7. See infra Part II.  In this Article, refernce to “the states” will include the District 
of Columbia (a total of 51). Note that it is difficult to determine the degree to which the 
IDEA language is duplicated, as well as whether state-specific language enhances the 
requirements or simply restates them. The author considered a state to have duplicated 
federal language when it was verbatim or quite similar to federal language; likewise, the 
author considered a state to have enhanced protections when any more specific and 
quantitative or qualitative language was added, without making a determination of the 
level of significance. 
 8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)-(G) (2018) (using the term Local Education Agency 
(LEA) to identify the entity responsible under the law to provide a free, appropriate 
public education to students with disabilities, and in the least restrictive environment, 
which is typically is the local school district). 
4
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for a model provision for Congress to adopt when IDEA is reauthorized.9 
I. FEDERAL LAW: INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
BEHAVIOR PROVISIONS 
The IDEA does not define the terms “functional behavioral assessment,” 
“behavioral intervention services and modifications,” or “behavioral 
intervention plan”–all terms used in the statute and critical components of 
any realistic attempt to modify behavior so that a student can benefit from 
his or her education.10  It does not even require an FBA or a BIP to be written 
or to be a component of the IEP, the “centerpiece”11 of the educational 
program for a student with disabilities.  It does not provide specific guidance 
as to the types of behaviors that trigger the need for a BIP, other than the 
general rule that it is needed “in the case of a child whose behavior impedes 
the child’s learning or that of others” and for changes in placement greater 
than ten days.12  It does not specify the type of information the IEP team must 
consider in determining the BIP, other than “to the extent appropriate . . . the 
general education teacher is required to participate in the determination of 
appropriate positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other 
strategies . . . .”13  Finally, it does not delineate who is qualified to conduct 
the FBA, or mandate the information that must be included in the BIP. 
The only direct obligation on school districts for the FBA and behavioral 
intervention services and modifications comes in what is commonly referred 
to as the Act’s discipline statute, section 1415(k).14  Thus, the IDEA 
mandates certain actions when school personnel move to change the 
                                                          
 9. IDEA was scheduled for congressional reauthorization in 2009. Congress has not 
begun that review and revision at the time of this publication. 
 10. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(F)(ii); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(F)(i)-(ii). 
 11. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 
994 (2017); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 753 (2017). See generally Honig 
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).  
 12. See Development, Review, and Revision of IEP, 34 C.F.R. § 300.324 (2017) 
(emphasis added) (requiring consideration, when “appropriate,” and “the use of positive 
behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior”); 
see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C). 
 13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(C).  Under the IDEA, the general education teacher 
is a mandatory IEP team member if a student spends—or may spend—time in the regular 
education classroom.  In most cases, the general education teacher is already present at 
the meeting.  This requirement allows him or her to participate in the discussions relating 
to behavior, in addition to academics.  20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 14. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii); see also PETER W. D. WRIGHT & PAMELA DARR 
WRIGHT, IDEA 2004, 118, n. 155 (1st ed. 2005). 
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placement of a student protected under IDEA for more than ten days.  
Whether or not the behavior is found to be a manifestation of the disability, 
the student has a right to “receive, as appropriate, a functional behavioral 
assessment, behavioral intervention services and modifications, that are 
designed to address the behavior violations so that it does not recur.”15 
If the IEP team has determined that the behavior was a manifestation of 
the disability, the IEP team must “conduct a functional behavioral 
assessment, and implement a behavioral intervention plan for such child, 
provided that the local educational agency had not conducted such 
assessment prior to such determination before the behavior that resulted in a 
change of placement . . .” 16  In the case of a student under this section who 
already has a behavioral intervention plan as part of the IEP, then the IEP 
team must “ . . . review the behavioral intervention plan . . . and modify it, 
as necessary, to address the behavior.”17 
These four short provisions constitute the entire requirement in the IDEA 
statute for dealing directly with serious behavior problems that have arisen.  
What the terms “functional behavioral assessment” or “behavioral 
intervention plan” mean, and how they are to be implemented, is left to the 
individual states.  In reviewing the approach of the states, one notices certain 
patterns.  This Article identifies three categories of defining and 
implementing the IDEA: (1) more expansive language beyond IDEA 
requirements to a greater or lesser degree; (2) no language at all, thus 
defaulting to the IDEA requirements; and (3) language that generally 
parallels or repeats the IDEA language.  Until July of 2013, California had 
the most specific requirements protecting students with serious behavioral 
problems.18 
                                                          
 15. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii) (empasis added). 
 16. Id. at § 1415(k)(1)(F)(i). 
 17. See id. at § 1415(k)(1)(F)(ii).  In discussing the failure of identifying behavior 
interventions without appropriate assessments and discussion by the IEP team, Dr. 
Dieterich and Dr. Villani note: “Furthermore, the new regulations are equally ambiguous 
and provide little direction for an IEP team in the process of completing an FBA or BIP.”  
Cynthia A.  Dieterich & Christine J. Villani, Functional Behavioral Assessment: Process 
Without Procedure, 2000 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 209, 210 (2000).  See also Mark D. 
Shriver, Cynthia M. Anderson & Briley Proctor, Evaluating the Validity of Functional 
Behavior Assessment, 30 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 180 (2001) (comparing the functional 
behavior assessment and traditional psychological assessment). 
 18. See A.B. 86, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., ch. 48 (Cal. 2013) (repealing sections of the 
law).  Note that up to that time, California had no appellate decisions dealing primarily 
with the FBA or BIP, which at least suggests that the concrete language and requirements 
had a positive impact as to what the law required. 
6
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II. STATE STATUTES AND RULES  
A. California—The Hughes Bill 
California’s Hughes Bill19–once considered the country’s strongest 
enactment for students with serious behavioral problems – was repealed by 
the state’s Legislature in July 2013 with Assembly Bill (AB) 86,20 an 
education omnibus trailer bill.  AB 86 revised California Education Code 
sections 56520-56525 and repealed California’s implementing regulations 
for those sections.21  The change became effective immediately; the “new” 
language mirrored federal law, which is basic at best, and retains none of the 
requirements that previously guided California’s school districts and parents. 
The revised code states that the intention of AB 86 was “that children 
exhibiting serious behavioral challenges receive timely and appropriate 
assessments and positive supports and interventions in accordance with the 
federal IDEA . . . and implementing regulations.”22  With such a massive 
repeal of requirements, many child advocates questioned the reasoning 
behind this rationale, since the statutory repeal was the result of years of 
lobbying by California’s school districts, school boards, and affiliated 
organizations.  Those arguing for repeal of the Hughes Bill maintained that 
the state’s statute and regulations were an unfunded mandate, and thus 
should not be required of school districts absent specific funding for the 
services.23 
                                                          
 19. California A.B. 2586 (Hughes) (Chapter 959, Statutes of 1990) (requiring “the 
development and implementation of positive BIPs for pupils with disabilities who exhibit 
serious behavioral problems,” implementing regulations that approved behavioral 
emergency procedures be outlined in the Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) 
plan, and stating that “behavioral emergency interventions shall not be used as a 
substitute for behavioral intervention plans”); see also A.B. 2586, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 1990), repealed by A.B. 86, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., ch. 48, §42(b) (Cal. 2013). 
 20. A.B. 86, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., ch. 48 (Cal. 2013) (repealing Assem. Bill 2586, 
1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1990)). 
 21. Id.; see also A.B. 2586 (Hughes) (Chapter 959, Statutes of 1990); CAL. CODE 
REGS. Title 5, § 3052 (2016). 
 22. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56520(b)(1) (Deering 2016). 
 23. See California AB 1610 (Committee on Budget) (Chapter 724, Statutes of 2010) 
(requiring districts to first fund Behavior Intervention Plans before using funding for any 
other special education services); see also Fagen, Friedman & Fulfrost, Post-“Hughes 
Bill” Behavioral Interventions and Reimbursements Claims, FAGEN FRIEDMAN & 
FULFROST (Aug. 2013), http://www.f3law.com/newsflash.php?nf=397 (reporting that in 
April 2013, the state’s Commission on State Mandates adopted a Statement of Decision 
for a reasonable reimbursement methodology to school districts that had created behavior 
intervention plans under the state’s requirement in effect at the time); see also Laurie 
7
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According to a California State Senate Floor analysis, the intent of these 
changes was to modify “the Behavioral Intervention Plan mandate to align it 
more closely with federal law and reduce unnecessary costs, while 
maintaining important protection for students with disabilities.”24  But 
without statutory and regulatory guidance, each school district in the state 
now is left to determine what constitutes an acceptable level of performance–
by its nature an unequal system.  Not only is variation highly likely, the lack 
of a uniform process puts a burden on school staff, who may or may not have 
the benefit of training in administration of these assessments.  Parent 
advocates argue that the revisions eliminated best practice and critical 
protections, and left them with the minimal federal language that leaves 
school districts and parents with a greater likelihood of conflict.  Prior to the 
repeal of the Hughes Bill, California students with serious behavior issues—
whether or not the student had been disciplined—had a right to a 
comprehensive, scientific approach to their needs in the school 
environment.25  For example, California regulations required a Functional 
Analysis Assessment (FAA) whenever the IEP team found that services 
(“instructional/behavioral approaches”) in the IEP intended to curb behavior 
had been ineffective.26  The FAA had to be conducted by, or be under the 
supervision of, a person who had documented training in behavior analysis 
with an emphasis on positive behavior interventions.27  After completion of 
the FAA, districts convening an IEP meeting to review the assessment with 
the parent had to expand the meeting to include a behavioral intervention 
case manager28 (BICM) with documented training in behavior analysis, 
including positive behavioral interventions.29 
Properly conducted by a trained professional, the FAA provided data that 
                                                          
Weidner, School Agencies Victorious in 20-year Battle for Special Ed Reimbursements, 
CAL. SCH. BD. ASS’N, (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.csba.org/Newsroom/Press
Releases/2013/012913_COSM.aspx. 
 24. S. Rules Committee, Assem. Bill 86, Senate Rules Committee, Office of Senate 
Floor Analyses, Third Reading, #6, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_
0051-0100/ab_86_cfa_20130614_132415_sen_floor.html. 
 25. A.B. 2586, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1990), repealed by A.B. 86, 2013-2014 
Reg. Sess., ch. 48 (Cal. 2013). 
 26. See CAL. CODE REGS. Title 5, § 3052(b) (2013) (stating that an FAA “shall occur 
after the IEP Team finds that the instructional/behavioral approaches specified in the 
student’s IEP have been ineffective”). 
 27. See A.B. 86, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., ch. 48 (Cal. 2013) (repealing section 
3052(b)). 
 28. See CAL. CODE REGS. Title 5,§ 3052. 
 29. §§ 3001(e), § 3052(a)(1). 
8
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was critical to developing a BIP that had any hope of success.  The repeal of 
this requirement along with new language meant California law simply 
restated the federal language: after a determination that behavior or conduct 
was a manifestation of the student’s disability, “the IEP team shall conduct 
a functional behavior assessment, and implement a behavioral intervention 
plan for such child” provided the district had not already conducted the FBA; 
if it had, then the district must review the BIP and modify it as necessary.30  
By repealing California’s more rigorous requirements, the Legislature 
eliminated the requirement for districts to use data to regularly evaluate the 
BIP’s effectiveness, along with language proscribing the method for 
modifications outside an IEP team meeting, contingency BIPs, and 
additional changes.31  Previously, the BIP was specifically defined;32 now, 
California law contains no such definition (similar to the federal law’s lack 
of specificty).  The repeal also eliminated the requirement of highly trained 
staff for data gathering and IEP development; BICMs were eliminated, and 
the role of board certified behavior analysts (BCBAs) changed.33 
California’s previous regulatory requirements for schools dealing with the 
serious behavioral problems of students with disabilities were extensive, 
specific and demanding.  Without these requirements, California joins states 
that now outright align their laws solely with the federal requirements34 
(statute and regulations) or list partial requirements and thus default into 
federal law.35  Since the federal law is largely silent on the requirements for 
                                                          
 30. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(F)(i)-(ii). 
 31. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (2007); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.323 (2006); CAL. 
EDUC. CODE § 56340 (2008). 
 32. A.B. 2586, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1990) (defining the BIP as a written 
document which is developed when the individual exhibits a serious behavioral problem 
that significantly interferes with the implementation of the goals and objectives of the 
individual’s IEP); CAL. CODE REGS. Title 5, § 3001(g) (2014) (repealing A.B. 86, 2013-
2014 Leg. Reg. Sess., ch. 48 (Cal. 2013)). 
 33. A.B. Bill 86, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess., ch. 48 (Cal. 2013). 
 34. Based on the data compiled for this Article, which included a review of all 50 
states and the District of Columbia, thirteen states merely repeat the federal language. 
These states include Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia. 
 35. See Perry A. Zirkel, State Special Education Laws for Functional Behavioral 
Assessment and Behavior Intervention Plans, 36 BEHAV. DISORDERS 262, 268-69 (2011) 
(listing the seventeen states that Zirkel found use some of the federal language: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin and 
Wyoming) [hereinafter State Special Education Laws]. 
9
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dealing with behavior under IDEA, states that rely on IDEA alone may use 
approaches that vary widely.  Without such guidance proscribing the 
expected actions required by the school district, school staff may evaluate 
behavior and create a BIP in myriad ways, leading to variance even among 
districts within a single state, which is then magnified throughout the 
country. 
B. State Responses to IDEA Behavior Provisions 
Although many states fall extremely short in providing their own 
requirements, or even clear direction for the federally-required FBA and BIP, 
slightly more than 40 percent of states currently provide a more expansive 
approach to the needs of their students.36  These include Delaware, District 
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. 
1. States with More Extensive Language than the Federal IDEA 
a. New York 
Among states that add to the federal requirements, New York haa arguably 
the most well-developed regulatory scheme to support students with 
behavioral challenges.  It begins with language that makes clear the factors 
which must be considered, requiring school districts to conduct FBAs “for a 
student whose behavior impedes his or her learning or that of others, as 
necessary to ascertain the physical, mental, behavioral and emotional factors 
which contribute to the suspected disabilities.”37  Similar to New 
Hampshire’s provision discussed below, New York’s language appears to 
reinforce the IDEA provision that assessment is a precursor to development 
of an IEP that offers free appropriate public education (FAPE),38 even if the 
                                                          
 36. There are various methods to analyzing the statutory language in the 50 states 
and Washington, D.C. This Article divides states into three categories: 1) states with 
more extensive language than the federal IDEA; 2) states with “mirror language” that 
simply repeats the federal law with some minor, helpful additions; and 3) states with 
some of the federal language or no language specific to the FBA and BIP.  Determining 
how to characterize the categories varies among authors.  See State Special Education 
Laws, supra note 35, at 264, 266; see also Perry A. Zirkel, An Update of Judicial Rulings 
Specific to FBAs or BIPs Under the IDEA and Corollary State Laws, 51 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 
50, 54 (2017). 
 37. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8, § 200.4(b)(1)(v) (2016) (emphasis 
added). 
 38. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) (2004). 
10
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need arises from a mental health diagnosis or emotional disturbance. 
New York’s Regulations of the Commissioner require the school to base 
its FBA on data obtained from “direct observation of the student, information 
from the student, the student’s teacher(s) and/or related service providers(s), 
a review of available data and information from the student’s record, and 
other sources including any relevant information provided by the student’s 
parent.”39  Further, New York requires that “the FBA shall not be based 
solely on the student’s history of presenting problem behaviors.”40  The 
emphasis on observations and parent input is helpful, but it assures validity 
when coupled with the other provisions, mandating the contents of the FBA 
detail a “baseline measure of the problem behavior, including the frequency, 
duration, and intensity and/or latency” of the student’s actions in relation to 
different “activities, settings, people, and times of the day.”41  The rules 
require “concrete terms” and an “identification of the contextual factors,” 
leading to development of a hypothesis.42  All of these requirements provide 
a framework for a more objective, data-driven analysis of the problem 
behaviors that informs the creation of the BIP, as New York also requires the 
BIP to be based on the FBA results.43  Additionally, the BIP must use the 
baseline measure of the behavior, collected for the FBA, to measure the 
progress of the student, and the effectiveness of the intervention.44  The BIP 
must include “strategies to be used to alter antecedent events to prevent the 
occurrence of the behavior, teach individual alternative and adaptive 
behaviors to the student, and provide consequences for the targeted 
inappropriate behavior(s) and alternative acceptable behavior(s),” utilizing a 
schedule to measure the effectiveness of the intervention.45  While not as 
expansive as California’s previous Hughes Bill, New York’s regulatory 
scheme captures the best practices espoused by behaviorists and 
psychologists, thus setting up its school IEP teams for success.46 
                                                          
 39. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8, § 200,; id. § 200.22(a)(2). 
 40. Id. § 200.22(a)(2). 
 41. Id. § 200.22(4)(i)(3) (stating language similar to California’s repealed language). 
 42. Id. § 200.1(r). 
 43. Id. § 200.22(b)(1)(i). 
 44. Id. § 200.22(b)(4)(i-iii) (employing language similar to what is commonly called 
the “ABC” approach–antecedents, behaviors and consequences). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See generally A.B. 2586 (Hughes) (Chapter 959, Statutes of 1990). 
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Delaware is another state that has a comprehensive statutory and 
regulatory approach to behavioral concerns, having adopted specific 
requirements in excess of the federal requirement. Beginning with 
identification of the presenting behavioral problem or issue, Delaware 
requires a description in “objective, measurable terms that focus on alterable 
characteristics of the individual and the environment,” and “examined 
through systematic data collection . . . defined in a problem statement that 
describes the differences between the demands of the educational setting and 
the individual’s performance.”47  Delaware thus requires data collection and 
analysis—something the federal law does not require and which most, if not 
all, behavioral experts believe is essential.  The IEP team must also develop 
a problem statement that defines the behavioral issues the student 
demonstrates.48 
Similar to New York, Delaware has a data collection and analysis 
requirement as part of the FBA.  But Delaware goes a step further, providing 
guidance for the direction of the inquiry, when it defines the assessment as 
one that contains “objective, measurable terms that focus on alterable 
characteristics of the individual and the environment.”49  In other words, 
Delaware mandates an individualized approach to behavioral issues, one that 
is objective (in a scientific sense) and measurable (easily understood by a 
layperson).  The state expects its school districts to use a methodical, data-
based process for examining all that is known about the presenting problem 
or behaviors of concern to better identify interventions that have a high 
likelihood of success.50  Data collection procedures must be “individually 
tailored, valid for the concern addressed, . . . reliable, and allow for frequent 
and repeated measurement of intervention effectiveness.”51  Delaware 
exceeds New York’s requirements in this regard by requiring frequent data 
collection, while New York only requires that the BIP include a schedule to 
measure effectiveness. 
The state’s approach does not end with data collection and subsequent 
measurement, but also includes key elements of intervention design, 
implementation, and progress monitoring. Interventions must be based on 
analysis of the data collected, a defined problem and—most importantly—
                                                          
 47. See 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 923.11.9.1.1 (2017). 
 48. See id. §§ 923.11.9.1.1-923.11.9.1.2.. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. §§ 923.11.9.1.1-923.11.9.1.3. 
 51. See id. § 923.11.9.1.2. 
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input from parents and those qualified to make “professional judgments.”52 
Thus, Delaware’s approach—sound collection of data, review of data for 
targeted interventions, and adjustments as needed—is individualized, but 
also easy easily understood by teachers and parents.53  The more formal code 
language requires “[s]ystematic progress monitoring with regular and 
frequent data collection, analysis of individual performance across time, and 
modification of interventions as frequently as necessary based on systematic 
progress monitoring data.”54  Determining effectiveness requires analyzing 
the individual student’s performanceand making decisions based on a 
comparison of initial levels (typically called baseline data) with rates of 
progress.55  While Delaware’s approach as a whole does not reach the extent 
and specificity of California’s now repealed statute and regulations56 or New 
York’s current regulations,57 it does presently stand out among states as one 
that provides a comprehensive, scientifically sound approach to the 
challenge of dealing with difficult behaviors in the educational setting, and 
it does so with data collection and program development in a fashion that 
provides concrete guidance for the school’s staff.58 
c. Georgia 
Similar to Delaware but not as specific, Georgia law defines the FBA and 
BIP.59  According to the Georgia statute, the BIP is a “plan for a child with 
disabilities included in the IEP when appropriate, which uses positive 
behavior interventions, supports and other strategies to address challenging 
behaviors and enables the child to learn socially appropriate and responsible 
behavior in school and/or educational settings.”60  The FBA is defined as:  
A systematic process for defining a child’s specific behavior and 
determining the reason why (function or purpose) the behavior is 
                                                          
 52. See id. § 923.11.9.1.3 (including language suggesting that behavioral experts, 
including therapists and clinical psychologists, should be involved in development of 
interventions). 
 53. See  
 54. See id. § 923.11.9.1.4. 
 55. Id. § 923.923511.9.1.5 (evaluating intervention effects). 
 56. See A.B. 2586, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 959, (Cal. 1990); see also CAL. CODE 
REGS. Title 5 § 3001(d)-(g); CAL. CODE REGS. Title 5 § 3052 (2013). 
 57. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8 § 200.1(r) (2000). 
 58. See 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 923.11.9 .1.3 (2011); see also §§ 923.11.9.1.5; § 
923.11.9.2. 
 59. See generally GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 160-4-7-.21(7), (20) (2007). 
 60. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 160-4-7-.21(7) (2007). 
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occurring.  The FBA process includes examination of the 
contextual variables (antecedents and consequences) of the 
behavior, environmental components, and other information related 
to the behavior.  The purpose of conducting an FBA is to determine 
whether a Behavioral Intervention Plan should be developed.61 
d. Florida 
Florida takes a more nuanced and much less delineated approach, 
requiring an FBA as part of a determination of eligibility62 under IDEA.63  
This approach has the benefit of ensuring that an initial assessment for 
special education eligibility always includes the social-emotional needs.  
Under Florida law, “[t]he FBA must identify the specific behavior(s) of 
concern, [and] conditions under which the behavior is most and least likely 
to occur.”64  When an FBA has been completed as part of a general education 
intervention, it may qualify, but only if the FBA conforms to the 
requirements.65  Florida law requires some basic elements in the FBA as 
well: documentation of the success or failure of general education 
interventions, a social/developmental history, a psychological evaluation,66 
and a review of educational data that considers the relationship between 
academic performance and the emotional/behavioral disability.67  It also adds 
one provision to the social/developmental history that is far from universally 
included, but can certainly be helpful: consideration of actions outside the 
educational environment.68 
                                                          
 61. See id. § 160-4-7-.21(20). 
 62. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 6A-6.03016(3)(a) (2009). 
 63. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(4) (2017) (stating school districts must assess all 
areas of suspected disability). 
 64. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 6A-6.03016(3)(a) (2009) (focusing on the 
occurrence of behaviors, without giving much attention to when behavior is unlikely to 
occur). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. § 6A-6.03016(3)(d) (stating the evaluation must include behavioral 
observations and interview data, an assessment of emotional and behavioral functioning, 
and possibly information on developmental functioning and skills as appropriate). 
 67. Id. § 6A-6.03016(3)(e). 
 68. Id. § 6A-6.03016(3)(c).  Although actions outside the educational environment 
are not the responsibility of the local education agency (LEA), this type of additional 
information can be important in determining the full picture of a student’s challenges.  
But note that parents should share this information carefully, as sometimes it can be used 
by an LEA incorrectly to draw conclusions as to what can be expected at school, or of 
the seriousness of the disability. 
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Illinois, likewise, requires behavioral interventions to be based on 
behavioral science, and defines the FBA requirements much more 
specifically than federal law.69  When a student requires a BIP, the IEP must 
take into account the findings of the FBA (as part of the federal requirement), 
a summary of prior behavioral interventions implemented or recommended, 
identification of the measurable behavioral changes expected, methods of 
evaluation, a schedule for review of effectiveness, provisions for 
communicating with the parents about interventions, and coordination 
between school and home-based interventions.70  While best practice among 
mental health professionals and behavioral experts suggests the importance 
of a consistent plan implemented for the same behaviors and with the same 
fidelity at school as at home, parents cannot be required to share home 
information or to participate in this approach. 71  Illinois also requires the IEP 
team to include a person knowledgeable about positive behavior strategies.72  
Despite the statute’s specificity in comparison to the federal statute, this 
latter requirement is such a low standard that it is unlikely to establish 
procedures that will be uniformly followed throughout the state.  Every 
special education or resource teacher presumably is knowledgeable, with 
some type of training in behavior strategies, however minimal, because even 
a single brief training would satisfy the vaguely worded requirement.  
Additionally, since the IDEA already has a requirement that the IEP team 
include “an individual who can interpret the instructional implications of 
evaluation results,”73 one person could fill both roles: a person 
knowledgeable about positive behavior strategies (required by state law) and 
a person who can interpret the instructional implications of evaluation results 
(required under IDEA). 
f. Indiana 
While Indiana’s law includes requirements for a student’s FBA, it does 
not reach the specificity of New York’s regulatory scheme.74  Indiana defines 
the FBA as a “process that uses data to identify patterns in the student’s 
                                                          
 69. ILL. ADMIN. CODE Title 23, § 226.75 (2016). 
 70. Id. § 226.230(b). 
 71. Id. § 226.230(b)(6). 
 72. Id. at § 226.230(b). 
 73. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B)(v) (2004). 
 74. See 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 7-32-41 (2008). 
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behavior and the purpose or function of the behavior for the student.”75  The 
inclusion of the word “patterns” suggests that the data gathering should go 
deeper, seeking out possible patterns and similar behaviors that could inform 
the IEP team members in developing the BIP.  Without such additional 
statutory language, a school district may well believe that it is meeting the 
federal requirement to assess, when it may be arguable whether there is 
sufficient information to determine specific remedial measures that could be 
effective for the student.  There seems to be flexibility in the state law as to 
whether Indiana considers this an “educational evaluation,” which then 
would require parental consent.76 
The state’s BIP requirements are slightly more developed.  Indiana 
incorporates some additional procedures into its BIP definition, such as 
maximizing “consistency of implementation across people and settings in 
which the student is involved.”77  However, the administrative code has an 
interesting addition that seems to minimize the relevance of the statutory 
language: “[t]he IEP can serve as the behavioral intervention plan as long as 
the documentation the parent receives meets all the requirements in this 
section.”78  This last section would permit an IEP team to believe it has met 
the law so long as the IEP language includes the basics, which could be 
possibly a recipe for confusion. 
There are some noticeable differences between the FBA and the BIP 
requirements of Indiana and best practices.  First, Indiana does not specify 
how data should be collected. Additionally, there is no requirement that a 
baseline of the student’s behavior be established for future measurement and 
comparison.  Further, Indiana has neither a requirement for a reassessment 
FBA nor for an updated BIP, other than standard language for any 
measurable annual goal in an IEP. 
g. Iowa 
Iowa similarly does not expand upon the FBA but approaches the IDEA 
requirement by focusing on a methodical problem-solving process for any 
education-related problem.79  At a minimum, Iowa requires these 
components: a description of the problem in objective, measurable terms that 
                                                          
 75. Id. 
 76. See id.; see also § id. 7-40-3(b)(3) (reflecting that flexibility is only meant if the 
school reviews existing data). 
 77. See § 7-32-10 (a)(3)(B). 
 78. Id. § 7-32-10 (b). 
 79. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. § 281-41.313(1) (2010). 
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require examination of the individual and environment through systematic 
data collection; defining in a problem statement the degree of discrepancy 
between the educational setting and the student’s performance; data 
collection and problem analysis, with identification of interventions that 
have a high likelihood of success; data used to plan and monitor interventions 
relevant to the presenting problem or behaviors of concern and collected in 
multiple settings using multiple sources of information and multiple data 
collection methods; and, most importantly, data that is valid, reliable, and 
allows for frequent and repeated measurement of intervention 
effectiveness.80  The last criteria—repeated measurement of intervention 
effectiveness—is critical in a functioning BIP.  Without consistent 
measurement, the BIP may simply continue without any real progress, absent 
a serious incident.  In this regard, Iowa far exceeds the federal standard, and 
in fact establishes one of the most important needs: regular measurements 
followed by new data and interventions as needed by analysis of that data. 
2. States with Language that Mirrors Federal Law with Minor, Helpful 
Additions 
a. Kansas 
The Kansas code language is very similar to federal language, but it does 
add a requirement that the BIP be incorporated into the student’s IEP.  Such 
incorporation ensures that the BIP becomes a necessary element of a FAPE 
for that student.81 
b. Maine 
Maine’s provisions, while not lengthy, define the FBA and provide 
direction to LEAs.  Its FBA definition discusses the use of direct and indirect 
assessments, delineates an expectation that the definition of behavior be in 
concrete terms, requires affective as well as cognitive factors that influence 
the challenging behaviors, and requires a hypothesis noting the conditions 
when a behavior occurs and probable consequences that maintain the 
behavior.82  The Maine statute disappoints in that it only suggests, rather than 
requires, that the FBA assessment results be used to develop Positive 
Reinforcement Interventions and Supports.  However, the state’s definition 
                                                          
 80. Id. at § 281-41.313(3) (stating these procedures under the heading “Systematic 
problem-solving process”). 
 81. See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 91-40-18 (explaining that FAPE is the standard by 
which courts measure whether a school district has met its duty to the student). 
 82. See 05-071-101 ME. CODE R. § 2 (LexisNexis 2015). 
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of an FBA suggests that the documentation of the assessment becomes part 
of the child’s educational record and is provided to the IEP team.83  Use of 
the permissive “may” weakens what is otherwise a reasoned approach to 
fleshing out the federal FBA requirement.  Perhaps to offset this, the Maine 
code has very specific language in reference to BCBAs, which describes how 
the BCBA should approach assessments and interventions.84 
c. Nevada 
Nevada’s FBA definition is minimal and seems to be included as a best 
practices model for assessors.  The language follows a more traditional and 
thorough scientific approach.  For example, it must include systematic 
observation with data for frequency, duration, and intensity of the 
challenging behavior; regular observation of the antecedent event(s);85 
identification of consequences (positive or negative reinforcement); analysis 
of the settings where the behavior occurs; a review of records for health and 
medical factors; and a review of the history of the behavior to determine 
which, if any, previous interventions were at least partially effective.86 
d. New Hampshire 
New Hampshire arguably has the shortest FBA definition—“an 
assessment of a student’s behavior”87—but one of the stronger intents, 
requiring schools to use the results of a behavioral assessment as the 
foundation of any program developed to address a student’s behavioral 
needs.88  While this requirement may be presumed necessaary under the 
IDEA in most cases and likely is voluntarily followed in many others, no 
other state has such specific language to use the assessment in this manner.  
                                                          
 83. Id. § 2(27) (2015). 
 84. Id. § 11.  See also C.M.R. 10-144-101, ch. II, § 28.08-2(B)(6) (Me. 1983) (listing 
a BCBA as one of the direct care staff authorized in the requirement for behavioral health 
professionals providing specialized services); C.M.R. 14-197-005, ch. 5, § 5.05 et 
seq. (allowing a Board Certified Behavior Analyst to develop a Behavior Management 
Plan, as well as including the BCBA as one of the assessors of an updated functional 
assessment). However, Section 5.05 applies to Mental Health professionals in other 
settings and is not part of the special education provisions. 
 85. NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 388.386, 385.080, 388.470, 388520 (2000) (providing that 
the antecedent event includes environmental, social and other factors that precede the 
targeted behavior, so as to determine the “why” – the function the behavior serves for 
the student (request or protest)). 
 86. Id. § 388.386 (2000). 
 87. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. ED. 1102.02(t) (2008). 
 88. Id. 1113.04(a) (2008). 
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However, as compared to other states such as Georgia and Illinois, there is 
no language defining it further or adding requirements for the FBA. 
e. New Jersey 
New Jersey adds just a bit of substance.  It requires that the FBA results 
be recorded in “a statement regarding relevant behavior of the student, either 
reported or observed and the relationship of that behavior to the student’s 
academic functioning.”89  This addition is somewhat misleading because 
there are great differences between behavior that is reported in any type of 
formal manner and behavior that is simply observed.  The latter could be as 
simple as a teacher or staff comment of a solitary observation, hardly 
determinant of any relationship to functioning in the classroom or on the 
playground. 
f. New Mexico 
New Mexico is somewhat of an anomaly. I t is silent on the FBA, but does 
provide guidance for behavior management services in the school setting, 
although the guidance simply confirms that such “services are one of many 
supplementary aids and services that may benefit a student with a disability 
under the IDEA.”90  It also has a relatively minor addition, focusing solely 
on students with autism.  For those students, however, the language is quite 
helpful: New Mexico mandates the IEP team to consider positive behavior 
support strategies based on relevant information, including  
antecedent manipulation, replacement behaviors, reinforcement 
strategies, and data-based decisions; and a behavioral intervention 
plan focusing on positive behavior supports and developed from a 
functional behavioral assessment that uses current data related to 
target behaviors and addresses behavioral programming across 
home, school, and community-based settings.91 
g. Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania’s statute begins with a more general but proactive approach 
                                                          
 89. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-3.4(h)(2) (2007). 
 90. Memorandum from State of N.M., Public Education Department Pub. Educ. 
Dep’t, Behavior Management Services in the School Setting (Sept. 1, 2015). 
 91. N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2.11 (LexisNexis 2007) (describing the use of positive 
behavior support, which is important and comports with the spirit of IDEA in that 
behavior as a disability needs positive strategies, not punitive measures, to be effective.)  
Additionally, New Mexico incorporates many best practices into its statute, including 
data-based decisions, replacement behaviors, and current data across all settings.  Id. 
19
Dalton: Forgotten Children: Rethinking the Individuals with Disabilities
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019
156 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 27 
 
 
using screenings, allowing a district to develop a program of early 
intervening services.92  For Pennsylvania districts meeting criteria relating to 
disproportionality,93 the district may develop a program; but if so, it must 
include a systematic observation in schools where the student displays the 
difficulty.94  The state reaches back to the FBA when discussing positive 
behavior support, requiring that programs and plans be based on a functional 
analysis of behavior.  Pennsylvania adds some minimal language to the end 
product, called the behavior support program, mandating that positive, rather 
than negative, measures form the basis of the program.95  The statute defines 
behavior support as the development, change, and maintenance of selected 
behaviors through the systematic application of behavior change 
techniques.96  Further, such plans must include methods that utilize positive 
reinforcement and other positive techniques to shape a student’s or eligible 
young child’s behavior, ranging from the use of positive verbal statements 
as a reward for good behavior to specific tangible rewards.97 
Such specific language for positive reinforcement is unusual; however, 
even when all team members agree that the support should incorporate 
positive techniques, without any specific direction, it is highly unlikely that 
this is consistent among the state’s districts.  School staff and parents alike 
realize that the development of positive behavioral supports, geared to the 
actions of an individual student, is time consuming and expensive; the 
teacher or aide must focus on an individual student, often for weeks or 
longer, attempting various strategies until one or more are successful.  
                                                          
 92. See 22 PA. CODE § 14.122 (2001). 
 93. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.646 (2017) (“Each State that receives assistance under Part 
B of the Act . . . must provide for the collection and examination of data to determine if 
significant disproportionality based on race and ethnicity is occurring in the State and the 
LEAs of the State with respect to (1) The identification of children as children with 
disabilities, including the identification of children as children with disabilities in 
accordance with a particular impairment described in section 602(3) of the Act; (2) The 
placement in particular educational settings of these children; and (3) The incidence, 
duration, and type of disciplinary actions, including suspensions and expulsions.”); see 
also Denise Marshll, Delay in Implementing IDEA Regulations Harms Children, 
COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS & ADVOCATES (June 29, 2018), https://www.
copaa.org/news/407271/Delay-in-Implementing-IDEA-Regulations-Harms-Children.
htm (arguing that the delay “is a direct offense to children, especially children of color”). 
 94. See C.F.R. § 14.122(c)(3) (2001) (emphasis added). 
 95. See id. § 14.133 (emphasizing positive measures similar to New Mexico’s 
statute). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.; see also § 14.104(b)(6) (2001). 
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Perhaps that is one reason why the statute focuses on the positive, while the 
practice at school lends itself to more punitive responses, using the rationale 
of the “disciplinary” process that applies to all students. 
h. South Carolina 
South Carolina differentiates itself with a requirement that examiners 
“should have completed training that is directly relevant to the assessment 
procedure being conducted.”98  Further, the state expands on requirements 
for assessment procedures, including a requirement that “methods of 
evaluation are sufficiently comprehensive . . . whether or not they are 
commonly linked to the category in which the student is suspected of having 
a disability.  This means that the team will need to develop data on behavior 
regardless of the disability category, and look to the function of the behavior 
to develop appropriate interventions.99  Typically, this should occur through 
a functional behavioral assessment.  The state even defines scientifically 
based research as “interventions or supports that must be accepted by a peer-
reviewed journal or approved by a panel of independent experts through a 
comparably rigorous, objective, and scientific review.”100  This portion of 
the state’s law comports with best practices, but is rare in the education 
setting. 
i. Texas 
The Texas language is quite similar to New Mexico, but at least “to the 
extent practicable,” directs its schools to consider strategies “based on peer-
reviewed, research-based educational programming practices.”101  While the 
goal of peer-reviewed programming was only added to the IDEA in 2004, it 
remains the gold standard.  When relied upon, it provides strong support for 
a district’s chosen strategies.  Further, the state expects these strategies 
                                                          
 98. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-243.1(A) (2018). 
 99. See What are Functional Assessments and the Four Main Functions of 
Behavior? NORTH SHORE PEDIATRIC THERAPY (August 31, 2015), https://nspt4
kids.com/therapy/what-are-functional-assessments-and-the-four-main-functions-of-
behavior/ (stating that “[t]he function of behavior is the reason people behave in a certain 
way,” and includes escape/avoidance, attention seeking, seeking access to materials, and 
sensory stimulation). 
 100. Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,539 (Aug. 14, 2006) 
(codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300) (quoting the Federal Register, Aug. 14, 2006, at 46683). 
 101. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1055 (2017). 
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“when needed, addressed in the IEP.”102  Although the addition of the words 
“when needed” weaken the language from a strict requirement to a 
preference, nevertheless the state brings the language back to the IEP and its 
protections. 
j. Utah 
Utah mirrors federal law, but then fleshes out the requirements for its 
students, with thorough definitions that may be used in various settings and 
for a range of ages.  The Utah State Board of Education (USBE) rules are, in 
effect, simply a reiteration of federal law:  
A student with a disability who is removed from the student’s 
current placement must ‘[c]ontinue to receive educational services 
so as to enable the student to continue to participate in the general 
education curriculum, although in another setting, and to progress 
toward meeting the goals set out in the student’s IEP; and receive, 
as appropriate, a functional behavior assessment, and behavior 
intervention services and modifications that are designed to address 
the behavior violation so that it does not recur.103 
Personnel must look to the definition most closely analogous with the 
development of behavior intervention services.  The Administrative Code 
definition states that a Functional Behavior Assessment means “a written 
document prepared by the Provider behavior specialist to determine why 
problems occur and develop effective interventions.  The results of the 
assessment are a clear description of the problem, situations that predict 
when the problem will occur, consequences that maintain the problem, and 
a summary statement or hypothesis.”104  When the FBA is approached in this 
manner, it “should produce three main results: a. Hypothesis statements that 
have: (1) Operational definitions of the problem behavior, (2) Descriptions 
of the antecedent events that reliably predict occurrence and non-occurrence, 
and (3) Descriptions of the consequent events that maintain the behavior; b. 
Direct observation data supporting these hypotheses; and c. A behavioral 
support and intervention plan.”105 
Further, Utah expects “a systematic process of identifying problem 
behaviors and the events that (a) reliably predict occurrence and 
                                                          
 102. Id. 
 103. UTAH STATE BD. OF EDUC., SPECIAL EDUC. RULES V.C.(1)(a)-(b), (2016). 
 104. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 539-4-3(2)(k) (2016) (applying to all persons with 
disabilities and not specifically to students in public education who have a right to 
FAPE). 
 105. UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, SPECIAL EDUC. RULES I.E. (18) (2017). 
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nonoccurrence of those behaviors, and (b) maintain the behaviors across 
time.”106  The BIP, in turn, is “a specific technique designed to teach the 
person skills and address his/her problems.  Techniques are based on 
principles from the fields of Positive Behavior Supports and applied behavior 
analysis.”107  “When making decisions on behavior interventions, the IEP 
team must refer to the USBE Least Restrictive Behavior Interventions (LRBI) 
Technical Assistance (TA) Manual for information on research-based 
intervention procedures.”108  Thus, taken together, Utah has enough detail 
for trained, experienced staff to create an effective BIP.  However, 
surprisingly, it is the lesser behavior support plan that describes what is 
needed to successfully respond to negative behaviors.109 
k. Washington 
The state of Washington merely adds a bit of advice for its districts, 
focusing on positive behavioral interventions.  However, the state includes 
some rare language that such interventions should “include the consideration 
of environmental factors that may trigger challenging behaviors and teaching 
a student the skills to manage his or her own behavior.”110 
l. West Virginia 
West Virginia does not expand on the federal requirements for dealing 
with behavior, but also includes environmental factors and a description of a 
BIP.  The BIP may include not only guidance, but also “consequences to 
promote positive change,” and “procedures for monitoring, evaluating and 
                                                          
 106. 21 UTAH BULL. 23 (Nov. 01, 2016). 
 107. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 539-4-3(2)(a) (2016). 
 108. UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, SPECIAL EDUC. RULES III.I (5)(a) (2017). 
 109. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 539-4-4(3)(4) (2016). The terms “behavior support plan” 
and “behavior intervention plan” are often used interchangeably, but they should not be. 
The BIP is found in federal law and used specifically for students with disabilities when 
their placement changes for more than ten days; the term Behavior Support Plan is not. 
However, the Behavior Support Plan often precedes a BIP; in Utah, it clearly has the 
more complete definition: “All Behavior Support Plans shall incorporate Positive 
Behavior Supports with the least intrusive, effective treatment designed to assist the 
Person in acquiring and maintaining skills, and preventing problems. Behavior Support 
Plans must: (a) Be based on a Functional Behavior Assessment. (b) Focus on prevention 
and teach replacement behaviors. (c) Include planned responses to problems. (d) Outline 
a data collection system for evaluating the effectiveness of the plan.”  Id. r. 539-4-4(3)-
(4). 
 110. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-172A-01142 (2016). 
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reassessing the plan as necessary.”111 
3. States with Some of the Federal Language or No Language Specific to 
the FBA and BIP 
The remaining states have no language on functional behavioral 
assessments or behavior intervention plans,112 or they mirror the language of 
IDEA, adding no additional, specific requirements. 
III. ANALYSIS OF KEY APPELLATE DECISIONS113 
Honig v. Doe,114 one of the first United States Supreme Court decisions 
on IDEA-related issues,115 remains the ultimate source on how to deal with 
behavioral problems in the school setting today.  The Court declined to 
“rewrite the statute to infer a ‘dangerousness’ exception,” thereby 
“establishing that the omission of an emergency exception for dangerous 
students was intentional.”116  Often misinterpreted, the Court simply meant 
to limit the school principal or district official’s authority to remove a student 
for behavior for more than a proscribed number of days, believing that the 
authority might be misused with students removed as a regular practice 
rather than when other measures of remediation failed.117  That ultimate 
authority rather should be at arms’ length and rest with an administrative 
hearing officer or—in extreme cases—through use of an injunction sought 
in civil court. Presumably, that bar would serve as motivation for school 
officials to look to more effective methods of dealing with serious behavior, 
so these students could remain in school with an ultimate goal of becoming 
productive members of society. 
                                                          
 111. W. VA. DEP’T OF EDUC. REG. 2419 (2014),  Additionally, a 2013 West Virginia 
Department of Education Training included detailed information on best practices.  See 
generally W. VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR FUNCTIONAL BEHAVIORAL 
ASSESSMENT (FBA) AND BEHAVIOR INTERVENTION PLAN (BIP) OVERVIEW (2013). 
 112. State Special Education Laws, supra note 35, at 268-69 (2011). 
 113. Decisions reviewed for this article do not include cases where restraint was a 
primary issue; likewise, unpublished cases are not included in this analysis. 
 114. Honing v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 308 (1988). 
 115. The legal authority at that time was the Education of the Handicapped Act, later 
amended and finally becoming the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 1990. 
 116. Honig, 484 U.S. at 306. 
 117. Id. at 316 (noting that at the time, the rule was a maximum of 30 days; today, it 
is 10 days); see also Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(k)(1)(B). 
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While it remains good law today, two reauthorizations of IDEA118 
subsequently added some protections for students; school principals or 
district officials may now remove a student to an alternative education 
setting for 45 days when the student: 
(i) carries or possesses a weapon to or at school, on school premises, 
or to or at a school function under the jurisdiction of a State or local 
educational agency; 
(ii) knowingly possesses or uses illegal drugs, or sells or solicits the 
sale of a controlled substance, while at school, on school premises, 
or at a school function under the jurisdiction of a State or local 
educational agency; or 
(iii) has inflicted serious bodily injury upon another person while at 
school, on school premises, or at a school function under the 
jurisdiction of a State or local educational agency.119 
This Article does not intend to revisit the issue of when behavior becomes 
too serious to be handled on a comprehensive school campus; rather, the goal 
is to consider current practice when behaviors become an interference for a 
particular student’s learning, or for other students and staff, thereby 
triggering one of the IDEA statutory provisions.  Therefore, this Article 
focuses on appellate cases from 2011 through 2017, where the FBA or BIP 
(or lack thereof) was a key issue in the resolution of the case. 
A review of those cases leads to an inescapable finding: until 2016, if a 
case involved problem behaviors, with a corresponding analysis of the 
appropriateness of an FBA or the lack of an FBA in an IEP, and that issue is 
included in the causes of action and the court’s deliberations, the LEA120 or 
state department of education will prevail, and the parents will lose, virtually 
every time, at least on that issue.121  The location of the circuit does not 
implicate the outcome, as the decisions generally did not vary between the 
circuits that issued decisions between 2011 and 2015: seven in the Second 
Circuit, two each in the Third and Eighth Circuits, and one each in the Fifth 
                                                          
 118. § 1415(k)(G) (including the weapons and drugs exceptions from the 1997 
reauthorization and a serious bodily injury exception from the 2004 reauthorization). 
 119. Id. 
 120. 34 C.F.R. § 300.28 (2006) (explaining that the local education agency means the 
school district, which may include students from one or more cities or unincorporated 
areas). 
 121. Cases considered for this paper include all Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal case 
decisions from 2011 to 2017 that include a primary cause of action relating to the 
functional behavioral assessment, excluding those dealing solely or primarily with 
aversive interventions and restraint. 
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and Tenth Circuits.122  The district prevailed, usually completely or on most 
of the issues including any dealing with the FBA, in all but two cases.123  It 
is not until 2016 that we begin to see a marked change. 
Generally in IDEA cases, one might expect trends that change over time, 
reflecting a reaction of districts to new pressures from the parent bar and, 
perhaps, societal growth in understanding the roots and causes of behavior, 
with corresponding applicability when developing IEPs.  However, that had 
not been the case when delving into the ambiguous FBA.  The general 
language in the statutory description lends itself to an “anything goes” 
mentality, first by most of the school districts and ultimately by many of the 
courts considering this critical part of an IEP.  Since federal law does not 
clearly define the elements of an FBA, courts have not attempted to do so, 
preferring to leave those decisions to the circuits and relying on the school 
districts as the experts.124  The appellate decisions across the country remain 
                                                          
 122. The seven in the Second Circuit were E.M. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 
758 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 2014); R.E. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (consolidating three cases: M.W. ex rel. S. W. v. New York City Dept. of 
Educ., 725 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2013); T.M. v. Cornwall Central, 752 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 
2014); C.F. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 746 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2014)).  In the Third 
Circuit were D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012) and D.F. v. 
Collingswood Borough Bd. Of Educ., 694 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2012).  In the Eighth Circuit 
are Park Hill Sch. Dist. V. Dass, 655 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2011) and K.E. v. Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2011).  Cases in circuits with only one published 
decision on point during the time period were R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dis., 
703 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012) and Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 
Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015); vaccated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
 123.  Both were in the Second Circuit, with C.F. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 
746 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2014) favoring the parents and ordering the district court on remand 
to enter judgment in the appropriate amount to them, and in one of three matters (R.K. 
no. 11-1474-cv) of the consolidated R.E. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 
(2d Cir. 2012).  Additionally, the appellate courts remanded two cases with somewhat 
favorable dicta for parents. See D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. Of Educ., 694 F.3d 
(3d Cir. 2012) (remanding for district court to substantively address student’s claims for 
compensatory education, while ruling against the student on the determination of 
attorney fees) and E.M. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(deciding on standing rather than the merits, but finding that the district court erred in 
affirming the decision of the state review officer that the district had provided FAPE, and 
then remanding the case back to the district court, suggesting strongly that the evidence 
be reviewed in light of the intervening case, R.E. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 694 
F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 124. This reliance is not so displaced; the U.S. Supreme Court in Rowley and 
following cases notes the expertise of the school districts. Rather, the reliance is 
misguided as many courts seemingly do not take into consideration any bias (explicit or 
implicit) on the part of the districts when challenged by parents. 
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strongly pro-school district, until two cases argued in 2016 in the Second 
Circuit appear to reverse that trend. 
A. 2011 
The virtual unanimity of the appellate court decisions until 2016 also 
suggests certain principles that guide these courts in IDEA cases.  That 
becomes more apparent when considering the dicta and rationale behind the 
opinions.  For example, the Eighth Circuit in 2011 rejected the parents’ 
argument that the lack of a behavior intervention plan was a procedural 
violation under the IDEA.  In Park Hill School District v. Dass, the appellate 
court examined the fact that the district had, through the IEP process, 
considered strategies and “address[ed] that behavior.”125  The district’s 
school staff was credible, the court stated, when school personnel testified 
that they would have done more for the student, including conducting an 
FBA and developing a BIP, if they had been allowed to try the plan proposed 
by the school; that plan then would have succeeded, been generally 
unsuccessful, or failed.126  The parents’ issue with that approach was 
predictable: by the time the students had failed, valuable time would have 
been lost, possibly forever.  The parents refused to enroll their twin sons at 
the district’s proposed placement, and unilaterally placed them at Partners, 
“a private school that specializes in educating children with disabilities.”127  
But since the district staff had observed the students significantly at Partners, 
and included some of the information and strategies gleaned from those 
observations in the IEP, the court believed the district met its duty. 
The district had offered FAPE, since the parents should have known the 
district would incorporate those observations into a plan for the students.  
The district prevailed.  The court also held that the lack of a behavior 
intervention plan in the IEP did not compromise the students’ right to FAPE, 
given that the school planned to use procedures that had been successful with 
other autistic students.128  This approach completely ignores the 
                                                          
 125. Park Hill School District v. Dass, 655 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 2011). Dass 
involved twin brothers with significant cognitive, social and communicative challenges, 
including autism.  Their parents had placed the brothers at a private, specialized school.  
Upon considering a transfer back to the public school, the parents expected the IEP to 
include a BIP, along with one-on-one instruction and other related services.  Instead, the 
district planned to use approaches that had worked with other students with autism. The 
parents objected to the offer on that and other grounds, including the lack of a BIP. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 764. 
 128. Id. at 767. 
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individualized nature of each and every IEP; such a statement in an IEP 
meeting could be expected to create strong disagreement from parents as to 
whether it satisfied the minimal requirement of meeting their child’s unique 
needs.  It is difficult to understand why the court would expect parents to 
rely on districts to modify or change a placement that the district’s team 
members had already identified as “appropriate.”  Parental disagreement in 
these cases well may result in a Due Process proceeding, as it did here where 
the appellate court found for the district. 
In another case in the Eighth Circuit that same year, the court in K.E. v. 
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 15129 held that the district provided the student 
with a FAPE since the student had met the Rowley130 standard.  Essentially, 
the Eighth Circuit found that “K.E. enjoyed more than what we would 
consider ‘slight’ or ‘de minimis’ academic progress,” since the student had 
passing grades, was promoted from grade to grade, and showed improvement 
in standardized tests.131  The fact that the district had created a “cohesive 
behavioral management plan” after conducting an FBA and using the results 
to do so was additional evidence in the district’s favor. The court relied on 
its reasoning in the earlier Neosho132 case, where it had decided that an IEP 
team must adopt and implement a cohesive FBA and behavioral management 
plan to ensure FAPE.133  In the instant case, the court held that Independent 
School District No. 15 had met that burden, basing its decision in part on the 
fact that the district conducted an FBA prior to developing a BIP and then 
implemented it by incorporating it into the student’s IEP.134 
In K.E., Circuit Judge Bye’s dissent in part is worthy of notice.  He first 
explains that behavior and academic progress are inevitably intertwined, 
insomuch as “academic progress if left unattended by an IEP or behavioral 
intervention plan” may be diminished or lost.135  His dissent also notes that 
the district did not acknowledge the student’s mental health issues, although 
the district made the argument that it had received contradictory information 
                                                          
 129. K.E. ex rel. K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795, 810 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 130. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 209 
(1982) (requiring personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the 
child to benefit educationally from that instruction). 
 131. K.E., 647 F.3d at 810. 
 132. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1029 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The fact 
that no cohesive plan was in place to meet [the child’s] behavioral needs supports the 
ultimate conclusion that he was not able to obtain a benefit from his education.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. K.E., 647 F.3d at 810. 
 135. Id. at 815 (Bye, J., dissenting in part). 
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as to whether K.E. had in fact been diagnosed with bipolar disorder.136  Thus, 
Judge Bye argues that the student did not receive educational benefit, 
because she could not—not when the district ignored some measure of 
behavioral concerns.  Judge Bye concluded in his dissent that the student was 
denied a FAPE because “the School District failed to develop an IEP or 
implement a behavioral intervention plan capable of conferring some 
educational benefit during the relevant years of schooling.”137 
B. 2012 
When considering IDEA cases where behavior is explicit or implicated in 
a cause of action, circuit courts of appeal outcomes in 2012 do not vary from 
2011, except in one decision.138  Hence, three decisions139 favor the district 
on this critical issue, with only one decision varying somewhat—a 
consolidated case where the court found just one of three cases for the 
parents.140  That predominant case, consolidating three similar cases 
involving students with autism who demonstrated behavior problems,141 
identified two specific procedural violation complaints by parents in all three 
cases: 1) the failure of the district to complete an FBA (or if attempted, to 
complete an appropriate one) to inform the BIP, and 2) a failure to include 
parent counseling as a related service.142  Both of these are mandated by New 
York statute.143 
Of interest here is the viability of the first claim, when parents argue a 
                                                          
 136. Id. at 808, 816. 
 137. Id. at 822 (agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in part). 
 138. R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 139. See id.; D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F. 3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012); R.P. v. Alamo 
Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F. 3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 140. R.E., 694 F.3d at 174. 
 141. Id. (consolidating three similar cases: R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11–
1474–cv; E.Z.-L. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11–655–cv; and R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Educ., No. 11–1266–cv). 
 142. Id. at 190. 
 143. Compare N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8, § 200.1(r) (2016) (requiring 
that the FBA include “the identification of the problem behavior, the definition of the 
behavior in concrete terms, the identification of the contextual factors that contribute to 
the behavior . . . and the formulation of a hypothesis regarding the general conditions 
under which a behavior usually occurs and probable consequences that serve to maintain 
it”) with CAL. CODE REGS. Title 5, § 3052 (2016).  While California prior to the repeal 
of the Hughes Bill had a significantly greater comprehensive statutory scheme, New 
York is one of the few states to at least attempt to define what constitutes a FAPE when 
an FBA is required. 
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district failed to conduct a proper FBA.  The Second Circuit makes clear that 
the “failure of the school district to conduct an FBA is a particularly serious 
procedural violation for a student who has significant interfering 
behaviors.”144  However, the court then provided other mechanisms to 
overcome the failure, stating that the omission “does not rise to the level of 
a denial of a FAPE if the IEP adequately identifies the problem behavior and 
prescribes ways to manage it.”145 
The seeming contradiction cannot readily be explained away.  Yet the 
Second Circuit attempted to do so by concluding that the true intent of the 
FBA requirement under IDEA is to provide the IEP team with sufficient 
information so that the IEP drafters (ostensibly the district and parents, but 
practically speaking, the district) have sufficient data and other information 
to address those behaviors with goals and services, depending on the 
student’s needs.146  It then follows that so long as the IEP team has sufficient 
information, the failure to conduct an FBA is a minor one.  Thus, it is intent 
that matters, not conformance with the statute—an unusual finding.  As a 
result, in two of the cases (R.E. on behalf of J.E. and E.Z.-L),147 the court did 
not find that the failure to conduct the FBA was serious enough to constitute 
a denial of FAPE.148  Only one case favored the student against the district: 
R. K. v. New York City Department of Education.149 
In R.K, one of the parents’ key allegations centered on the Department’s 
failure “to conduct an FBA despite R.K.’s serious behavior problems.”150  
Considering this a procedural violation, the court concluded “that the IEP 
was inadequate,” and found that this was “reinforced by the CSE’s 
[Committee on Special Education] failure to create an FBA or BIP for 
R.K.”151  Here, in contrast to the decision in Park Hill School District v. 
Dass, the court was not persuaded by a district teacher that testified “that she 
                                                          
 144. R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; see also Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 
1024 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 145. R.E., 694 F.3d at 190. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at 193, 195-96 (finding that the students in two of the consolidated cases 
were not denied an FBA). 
 148. See id. at 174 (reversing the District Court’s decision in R.E. and E-Z-L v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Educ.). 
 149. Id. at 195-96 (affirming the District Court’s decision in R.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Educ.). 
 150. Id. at 193. 
 151. Id. at 194. 
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would have created a BIP once R.K. was in her class.”152  The decision found 
that the testimony should be disregarded because the failure was substantive 
in nature, and no retrospective approach could remedy that.  In other words, 
the court will consider what the district knew and did at the time of the IEP 
meeting, not what it might have done with new knowledge.  The court 
awarded full reimbursement to the parents for costs undertaken on behalf of 
their daughter. 
In the last of the three cases consolidated for the opinion, E.Z.-L. does not 
fare as well as R.K.  Like the plaintiff in R.K., one major claim was the 
district’s failure to conduct an FBA.153  However, the Second Circuit in E.Z-
L. upheld the district court’s ruling that the student was not denied a FAPE.  
The district court had found that “the Department’s proposed placement was 
substantively adequate.”154  This mirrors the reasoning in R.E.: an IEP “need 
only be reasonably calculated to provide likely progress.”155  The court found 
that the parents did not “seriously challenge the substance of the IEP,”156 but 
relied instead on whether or not it could be implemented effectively at the 
public school.  Determining a problem with implementation prior to a school 
having the opportunity to implement the IEP is not only a weak argument; it 
is a losing one.  Although the parents added a complaint about the lack of a 
transition plan, the court found that was not sufficient to make a successful 
claim for substantive inadequacy, particularly when the parents, according 
to the court, did not explain the significance of such a lack.  More damaging 
to the parents’ case was the teacher’s testimony that the “behavior does not 
seriously interfere with instruction.”157  Thus, the parents did not even meet 
                                                          
 152. See id. (stating the state review officer’s (SRO) reliance on the teacher’s 
statements were “not appropriate and must be disregarded”). 
 153. R.E., 694 F.3d at 194. 
 154. R.E. v. N.Y.C. at 195. R.E. involved a young student with autism. Her parents 
rejected the Department’s offer and placed her at a private school, where she had 
behavioral supports and made good progress.  The Department later agreed that the 
earlier offer was inappropriate, but subsequently offered a different placement at a 
specialized public school moving forward. The parents disagreed with that offer, in part 
because it did not include an FBA or a BIP; parents then filed for Due Process.  
Ultimately, the case ended up at the appellate level. E.Z.-L.’s case was consolidated with 
two other similar cases, and decided in R.E. v. N.Y.C. 
 155. Id. at 196.  The cited section (an “IEP need only be reasonably calculated to 
provide likely progress”) is the Rowley standard, but note that Endrew F.ex rel. Joseph 
F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 98, 99 (2017) may have increased the duty. 
 156. Id. (comparing E.Z.-L.’s challenge to the IEP to the other cases the court 
considered). 
 157. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
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the initial threshold for a denial of FAPE as to the absence of a BIP. 
The remaining two appellate decisions in 2012—one in the Third Circuit 
and one in the Fifth—do not vary in outcome: both held for the district.  In 
the Third Circuit case, D.K. v. Abington School District,158 the court did not 
award compensatory education for D.K., even though the student’s behavior 
worsened, his grades declined, and his parents sought outside services.  In 
the underlying matter, the District Court opined that performing an FBA as 
part of the initial IEP assessment may be “a matter of good practice” but is 
not required.159  The appellate court affirmed, finding that good practice is 
not required for students prior to qualifying under the IDEA; rather, the law 
only required an FBA after a student has qualified for an IEP and 
demonstrates a need.160  The Third Circuit accepted the district court’s 
conclusion that “the District was not required to conduct a functional 
behavioral analysis of D.K. in 2006 because he had not been identified as a 
special needs child by either the school district or private experts, the court 
said.”161 
The Third Circuit explained that the district “developed behavior 
improvement systems . . . and offered D.K. special attention and testing 
accommodations.”162  Since the court found that the district evaluated D.K. 
appropriately, the district’s duty is complete until a student exhibits the 
serious behaviors explicit in IDEA’s discipline procedures.  The court found 
                                                          
 158. D.K. ex. rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F. 3d 233, 254 (3d Cir. 
2012).  D.K. was an elementary student who experienced difficulties from his entrance 
into kindergarten. In spite of this, the district declined to identify him under the IDEA, 
instead trying various behavioral strategies. D.K.’s struggles continued for years, during 
which the district did not evaluate him, and did not perform an FBA. One major issue in 
this case was “child find,” the district’s duty under IDEA to identify, locate and evaluate 
students who may qualify for special education. Id. 
 159. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.08-cv-4914, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
29216, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2010). 
 160. D.K., 696 F. 3d at 253.  This novel approach to the IDEA’s “child find” 
requirement would mean that a district can wait until a child qualifies for an IEP, try out 
the initial offer of FAPE for months if not longer, assuming the parents consented to the 
IEP, and then at a later date—if circumstances worsen—perform the FBA and create a 
BIP. To devalue the FBA and BIP as simply “good practice” is to greatly diminish their 
importance. At every juncture in which a district assesses, IDEA requires assessment in 
all areas of suspected disability. That includes the initial assessment to determine whether 
a student qualifies for special education and related services. It makes no sense for a 
court to relegate the FBA and BIP to something that can wait when a district has notice 
that a student has behavioral difficulties that impact his or her education. 
 161. D.K., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29216, at *9. 
 162. D.K., 696 F.3d at 254. 
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that the district met its minimum duty, and justified that finding, in part, on 
the fact that the district provided testimonial evidence that D.K.’s behavior 
improved and “his continuing misbehavior was typical of boys his age.”163  
At a minimum, however, the IDEA requires assessment in all areas of 
suspected disability.  So unless it was in complete ignorance of the 
behavioral issues, the district should have included a behavior assessment of 
some type as part of the initial qualifying assessment. 
In D.F. v. Collingswood Borough, a student’s somewhat extreme 
behaviors were a minor issue in the decision, as the district had a certified 
behavior analyst perform an FBA, after not implementing a BIP from a 
previous school.164 
The Fifth Circuit, in R. P. v. Alamo Heights Independent School District165 
maintained correctly that the federal requirement to conduct an FBA before 
creating a BIP only becomes operative when the student has a certain 
outcome in a disciplinary matter—when a district has imposed a change of 
placement of greater than ten days on a student.166  Best practices suggest 
otherwise, but a district cannot be held to that standard when the law at the 
time only required the school to offer “personalized instruction with 
sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from 
that instruction.”167   
While this is a recurrent theme in decisions since 1997, when Congress 
amended IDEA to add language regarding conducting an FBA and 
                                                          
 163. Id. at 252  The “boys will be boys” rationale is particularly surprising in this 
context, as schools do not recognize that as a reason not to discipline boys who do not 
meet the behavior requirements in that setting. 
 164. See D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. Of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 
2012) T This decision is only other appellate decision in the Third Circuit that year 
focusing on IDEA requirements when a student’s behavior becomes violent (and thus 
serious). It does not provide much guidance, as the district performed an FBA, and then 
implemented a one-on-one aide, a key component of the previous IEP. Thus, the 
reviewing court spent little time on that element. The parents’ legal arguments focused 
on classroom placement after an out-of-state move, the timing of an aide appointment, 
and attorney fees. The court remanded on the issue of compensatory education.  Id. 
 165. See R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 813 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 166. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)-(5) (2006). 
 167. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 
(1982). The standard set by the Supreme Court in Rowley has since been refined (or 
expanded, depending on the point of view) to a requirement that the district “offer an IEP 
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 
98, 99 (2017) (emphasis added). 
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implementing a BIP168 the court in R.P. does not rely on that standard alone.  
Rather, the court believed the facts presented by the district contained “ample 
evidence and testimony” that the student was well-behaved.169  That negates 
any need for an FBA or BIP. 
C. 2013 
The only published appellate decision in 2013 that focused on the FBA or 
BIP was again in the Second Circuit, where New York law is much more 
specific than most state laws.170  The court in M.W. v. New York City 
Department of Education quickly dispensed with an in-depth review, but 
explained that an IEP is not legally deficient when the school does not 
complete an FBA prior to a BIP.  The regulations only require an FBA “as 
necessary.”171  Instead, the regulations only serve as part of the requirement 
to determine behavioral factors to develop an effective BIP.172  Once again, 
the court found no denial of FAPE, stating that the FAPE standard simply 
requires identification of problem behaviors, implementation of strategies, 
and what amounts to a good faith effort to remedy the behaviors in some 
fashion.173 
D. 2014 
The Second Circuit stood alone among the circuits in 2014; the two 
appellate circuit decisions in the country that had a significant FBA issue 
that year were from one jurisdiction—New York.  The outcome, however, 
                                                          
 168. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-17, § 1, 111 Stat. 37. 
 169. See R.P., 703 F.3d at 813. 
 170. See M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 140-41 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 171. Id. at 140. See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8 § 200.4(b)(1)(v) 
(2018). 
 172. M.W., 725 F,3d at 140. 
 173. See id. at 139-41.  M.W. discusses the more stringent N.Y.C. Department of 
Education provisions (requiring an FBA “as necessary” before a BIP).  This is a higher 
standard than federal law which requires the FBA only with a disciplinary change of 
placement that is greater than ten days. The 2nd Circuit, however, determined that the 
state’s FBA requirement could be met in other ways. That seems to run counter to the 
law, although the state language provides some flexibility with the “as necessary” 
language. This interpretation appears to be a method for minimizing the requirement, 
placing decision-making on the district to determine when it is needed. 
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varied with one decision for parents174 and one for the district.175  An 
additional case was remanded after overturning a summary judgment: while 
the lower court had concluded that the lack of an FBA was not a procedural 
violation, it did so because the school had developed a BIP “to the extent 
required by IDEA.”176  So it is unlikely that the case would have been 
overturned on a procedural or substantive argument on the importance of the 
FBA to the development of a BIP. 
One likely reason for the parents’ success in C.F. v. New York City 
Department of Education is that New York law goes beyond the statutory 
language of IDEA.  While not requiring an FBA in all instances, it 
nevertheless requires it “as necessary to ascertain the physical, mental, 
behavioral and emotional factors which contribute to the suspected 
disabilities.”177  The Second Circuit emphasized that this is not a per se 
requirement; certainly, the language “as necessary” validates that view.  
Therefore, it was not the lack of an FBA, but rather “the failure to produce 
an appropriate behavioral intervention plan,”178 because New York law 
defines the elements of a BIP.  It must “create and implement behavioral 
strategies” and “match strategies with specific behaviors,” not simply list 
behaviors and strategies.179  The parents, and ultimately the student, 
prevailed in C.F. largely because the reviewing court determined that the 
BIP was inadequate and the inadequacy could be traced to the lack of an 
FBA.   
Thus, it is even more surprising that in T.M. v. Cornwall, the court held 
that there was no denial of FAPE when Cornwall failed to conduct an FBA 
or prepare a BIP.180  The appellate court affirmed the district court’s 
decision—which in turn, had affirmed the State Review Officer’s (SRO) 
decision that Cornwall was within the law, regardless of its absence.  The 
court relied heavily on the SRO’s evaluation of T.M.’s behavior and its 
                                                          
 174. See C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(holding that the Department failed to match specific strategies with specific behaviors 
of the child). 
 175. See T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F. 3d 145, 169 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
 176. E.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 449 n.11 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 177. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8, § 200.4(b)(1)(v) (2016) (emphasis 
added). 
 178. C.F., 746 F.3d at 80. 
 179. Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8, § 200 (2016); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. Title 8, § 200.4 (2016). 
 180. See T.M., 752 F.3d at 169. 
35
Dalton: Forgotten Children: Rethinking the Individuals with Disabilities
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019
172 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 27 
 
 
impact on his education.  While there are fact-specific elements that support 
the analysis, the SRO nevertheless made a mental health and behavioral 
health determination, which typically is outside the agency reviewer’s area 
of expertise.  Although it can be argued that these are educational decisions 
rather than psychological ones, when behavior is at issue it is difficult to 
reliably separate the two.  Lack of expertise by the review officer in the area 
of behavior is not typically challenged, but it should be. 
Since the decision in T.M. appears to contradict what New York state law 
requires, it is important to ask how the appellate court could have found for 
the district.  Essentially, the court nullified the state’s statutory requirement 
when it held that the failure to conduct an adequate FBA is a “serious 
procedural violation,” but if the school district personnel on the IEP team 
dealt with it in another fashion such as considering developing strategies for 
the behavior—a very loose and unscientific approach—the appellate court 
was disinclined to overturn the district court.  While deference is always a 
consideration in these IDEA cases, as with many others on appeal, it can be 
argued that such deference when the law clearly has been violated sets the 
stage for a carte blanche: a school district can ignore the statutory 
requirements so long as it gives some token attention to the underlying 
principle. 
The 2004 Reauthorization of IDEA severely restricted procedural 
violations of FAPE except in three general instances.181  When state law has 
a higher standard such as that in New York, it is not unrealistic to expect that 
requirement to be affirmed in court decisions, at least the majority of the time 
and absent other extenuating facts.  However, that has not occurred often; 
circuit decisions allow for a work-around.  For example, the Second Circuit 
in T.M. held that such a serious procedural violation (not meeting 
requirements for students with behavioral issues) “does not rise to the level 
of a denial of a FAPE if the IEP adequately identifies the problem behavior 
and prescribes ways to manage it.”182  Another case that year reached the 
same conclusion since the department had created a BIP that adequately 
considered “behavioral interventions and strategies to the extent required by 
                                                          
 181. Procedural violations rise to a level of a substantive violation when they (1) 
impeded the student’s right to FAPE;( 2) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity 
to participate in the decision-making process; or (3) caused a deprivation of educational 
benefits. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. 
§1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(I)-(III) (2004). 
 182. T.M., 752 F.3d at 169 (quoting R.E. v. New. York. City Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 
167, 190 (2012)). 
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Contrast the outcome in C.F.,184 where the reasoning was similar but the 
outcome favored the parents.  First, the Second Circuit found the lack of an 
FBA—when one clearly was required by the statute and would arguably 
have enabled the school to have important information to develop the BIP—
failed as the basis for a claim against the district for a denial of FAPE.185  
Noting that the court should “take particular care to ensure that the IEP 
adequately addresses the child’s problem behaviors,” since IDEA does not 
actually require an assessment, the court surprisingly did not find the district 
at fault on that failure—even though the state law was rather explicitly 
violated.186  But in a circular fashion, the Second Circuit then reasoned that 
the BIP, which was not appropriate, was the true procedural violation187 even 
though without an FBA it is extremely difficult to develop an appropriate 
BIP.  The court in C.F. held that the parents prevailed, since the education 
department failed to adequately create and implement behavioral strategies 
in its BIP.188  The Second Circuit reached this interesting result by ignoring 
New York’s requirements for an FBA, but focusing on the requirements for 
a BIP.189  It chose to emphasize the lack of an effective BIP rather than the 
lack of a FBA.190  Also at play in the court’s decision was the fact that the 
administrative hearing officer relied on retrospective evidence from the 
department.  The court stated that retrospective evidence should not and 
generally is not relied upon in IDEA cases. This makes sense because 
accepting what the school might have offered in the IEP instead of what it 
did offer could always cure a violation and would limit the parents’ rights.191 
E. 2015 
The sole appellate decision in 2015 that considered the importance of 
IDEA’s requirements for students with troubling behaviors concentrates on 
                                                          
 183. E.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 449 n.11 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 184. See generally C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 746 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
 185. See id. at 80 (quoting M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 
140 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. Id. at 80-81. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. 
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the letter of the law.192  In Endrew F., the Tenth Circuit looked to the 
statutory language, which only requires a district to conduct an FBA “as 
appropriate,” develop behavior plans when a student is removed from a 
current educational placement for more than ten days, and consider the use 
of positive behavioral interventions and supports, as well as other strategies 
to address that behavior if the behavior impedes learning.193  Wisconsin has 
no additional provisions in state law, as compared to New York where state 
law requirements add to the IDEA language.194  In the closely watched case, 
the U.S. Supreme Court later overruled the Tenth Circuit, but did not reach 
the FBA and BIP claim—most likely in part because Wisconsin’s practice 
corresponds to federal law, if not best practices.195 
F. 2016-2017 
It is too early to discern what may have precipitated the change in the 
Second Circuit’s approach from the earlier cases already discussed to those 
in 2016, and whether it is a trend that will continue.  But the two cases196 
argued in 2016 (with one decision in 2016 and the other in 2017) both found 
for the parents on substantially similar issues dealing with the FBA and BIP.  
In each, the Second Circuit found that a male student with autism had been 
denied a FAPE, one on procedural grounds and the other on substantive 
grounds. 
                                                          
 192. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 
1334 (10th Cir. 2015), overturned by 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
 193. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) 
(2004)(emphasis added); see also 20 U.S.C. 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii) (2004). 
 194. Yet the two 2014 New York cases split—one for parents and one for the 
district—even though the state’s own provisions raise the bar for an FBA and BIP.  See 
generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8, §§ 200-201. 
 195. Best practices do not end with “[b]uilding an intervention plan for an individual 
child. This may be necessary but is almost never ‘sufficient.’”  See Horner and Yell, 
Commentary on Zirkel: Judicial Rulings Specific to FBAs or BIPs Under the IDEA and 
Corollary State Laws—An Update, 51 J. OF SPECIAL EDUC. 58 (2017).  The authors 
recommend “demanding the development of a full set of accommodations that result in 
academic, social, and physical growth,” with the FBA/BIP process ostensibly providing 
the structure to achieve that. Id. 
 196. See L.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 822 F.3d 95, 124 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that 
omissions of an FBA and a BIP, among other serious procedural violations, cumulatively 
deprived the student of a free, appropriate public education); A.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Educ., 845 F.3d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that while the cumulative effect of the 
Department of Education’s procedural errors did not deprive student of a FAPE, the IEP 
for the student was substantively inadequate). 
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In L.O. v. New York City Department of Education, K.T.197 was a twenty-
year-old student with severe behaviors, including pica (eating staples), 
“frequent and sudden mood and personality changes,” and physical 
aggression, “many times for no apparent reason.”198  Nevertheless, over a 
three-year period, the local CSE apparently ignored New York’s regulatory 
requirement to conduct an FBA to develop an appropriate BIP.  Along with 
additional procedural violations,199 the court held that “the errors we have 
identified in each IEP cumulatively resulted in a denial of a FAPE for K.T. 
for the 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2011-2012 school years.”200 
The court’s analysis is particularly relevant as it is rare for any appellate 
decision to cite the lack of an FBA as a denial of FAPE.  At least in the 
Second Circuit, there seems to be a new understanding of the importance of 
the FBA when dealing with serious behaviors that interfere with education, 
and the reality that absent the more formalized approach of an FBA, a 
student’s needs are not met. 
In contrast to L.O., the court in A.M. v. New York City Department of 
Education found the cumulative effect of procedural failures did not 
constitute a denial of FAPE for E.H.  However, the court (referencing the 
FBA) did hold that the IEP was substantively inadequate because the 
student’s behavior needs were not met through the placement and services 
offered by the Department of Education.  Specifically, the IEP did not 
include Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) therapy, even though assessments 
and statements from the private school demonstrated that it had been 
effective. 
Thus, the IEP as developed by the Department of Education (DOE) denied 
the student his right to a free, appropriate public education.201  Admittedly, 
the court did not find the lack of the FBA and BIP a procedural error serious 
enough to deny FAPE, but it used that lack to find substantive inadequacy.  
The court explained that “[b]ecause the CSE team concluded that E.H.’s 
                                                          
 197. L.O., 822 F.3d at 101-02 (noting K.T. is the child with the disability; L.O. is the 
parent). 
 198. Id. at 103-104. 
 199. The court found that three of these procedural violations were serious error: (1) 
the failure of the CSE to review evaluative materials (or to demonstrate that it had done 
so); (2) the failure to include adequate speech and language provisions and services; and 
(3) the failure to conduct the FBA. See id. at 123. The court did not find a serious 
procedural error in the goals and objectives, or the lack of parental training and 
counseling. See generally id. at 95-125. 
 200. Id. at 123. 
 201. See A.M., 845 F.3d at 545. 
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behaviors seriously interfered with instruction, the IEP required the 
development of a [BIP],which was incorporated into the IEP.”202  It also 
faulted the CSE for not completing its own FBA but rather relying on “the 
draft [FBA] submitted by [the school],”203 and spent almost no time (“maybe 
10-15 minutes”) creating a summary of the school’s FBA document, which 
resulted in “the barebones nature of the BIP.”204 
The court, drawing from C.F. in 2014,205 notes that the DOE’s failure to 
conduct an adequate, individualized FBA206 and create a BIP using that data 
was a strong factor in the student’s favor, as was the District Court’s reliance 
on a single district witness (Nessan O’Sullivan, the school district 
representative and a DOE psychologist),207 who had not even observed the 
student in person.208  Although there was no cumulative effect from the 
procedural errors, the IEP was not “reasonably calculated to enable [E.H.] to 
receive educational benefits.”209  Thus, the court found for the student, 
stating that the “deficiencies rendered E.H.’s IEP for the 2012-2013 school 
year substantively inadequate, thereby depriving E.H. of a FAPE.”210  This 
inadquacy, the court reasoned, was in part because the Department of 
Education failed to conduct its own FBA and utilize that data to develop 
strategies and interventions in a BIP.  This circular reasoning nevertheless 
emphasizes the importance of the FBA and BIP for the student.  Unlike K.T. 
in L.O., the court did not find that the procedural failures cumulatively 
caused a denial of FAPE; rather, the sum of the many procedural lapses 
impacted the IEP in such a way that the court found a substantive failure.211  
The Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision and remanded it for 
the District Court to consider whether the parent’s placement decision was 
appropriate and whether equity required tuition reimbursement. 
                                                          
 202. Id. at 530. 
 203. Id. (noting that federal law requires districts to perform their own evaluations; 
outside evaluations must be considered but do not have the same weight). 
 204. Id. at 536. 
 205. Id. at 543 (quoting C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 746 F.3d 
68, 81(2014)). 
 206. See id. at 545 (quoting C.F., 746 F.3d at 81). 
 207. See id. at 529. 
 208. See id. at 536. 
 209. Id. at 545 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 
458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)). 
 210. Id. at 545, 546 (emphasis added). 
 211. The court does not state the result that simply, but it appears clear that is what 
the court intended. See id. at 546. 
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IV. RETHINKING THE IDEA BEHAVIOR PROVISIONS 
A. The Forgotten Children 
Behavior is one of the most challenging of all special education needs.  If 
the law is serious about protecting students with these issues, the importance 
of a well-crafted FBA cannot be overstated.  The IDEA language is weak, 
requiring the development of an FBA only if appropriate and mere 
consideration of positive behavioral supports.  This language does not 
properly reflect the importance of this provision in the law and ignores the 
science behind the FBA. 
There is little discussion of the greater adverse impact on boys, African-
American students, and students with disabilities.  The IDEA is facially 
neutral, and its origins are found in a time during the 1970s when students 
with disabilities had no access to education at all.  The emphasis for almost 
thirty years has focused on access to education and services, with little 
discussion of the statute’s lack of concrete direction on services to respond 
to behavior issues.  That void has inadvertently allowed a particularly 
negative impact on boys, African-American students, and students with 
disabilities to a greater degree than other groups.212  Amending IDEA’s 
behavior provisions with clearly defined requirements could go a long way 
in reducing out-of-school time for these students as well as others. 
Each student’s behavioral history is unique.  One student might benefit 
from positive reinforcement with less structure; another student may need a 
highly structured program with more sparse rewards.  Knowing the reason 
for the behavior—the antecedent—is a crucial first step in understanding the 
behavior and crafting a BIP with some chance of success.  Once identified, 
trained staff can then—and only then—develop a data collection plan across 
all settings, critical information for the school psychologist, and IEP team to 
utilize in developing an effective BIP. 
Properly trained staff, ideally including a board-certified behavior analyst 
or a school psychologist with intensive training, is critical.  Data collection 
is an art and a science, beginning with that IEP team’s first identification of 
behaviors to track.  It is far too easy for untrained staff to set up the student’s 
behavior subjectively: consider the difference between tracking behavior 
where the behavior is identified as “hostilility to others,” compared to 
                                                          
 212. See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL CLIMATE AND 
SAFETY 13-15 (2018).  African-American males made up 8 percent of the K-12 public 
school enrollment, but experienced 23 percent of the expulsions.  Id.  This trend 
continues for males and African-American students in numbers of out-of-school 
suspensions and the same applies to students with disabilities. Id. 
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identifying the behavior as “making negative comments when frustrated.”  
While both may collect similar information, how the IEP team sees the 
behavior and formulates a plan to deal with the behavioral data can subtly 
change when the student is seen as the problem, instead of the student’s 
behavior.  As Dieterich & Villani explain in their 2017 review of FBAs and 
BIPs, the FBA “goes beyond the visible behaviors and focuses on identifying 
social, biological, affective, familial and/or environmental factors that 
trigger or sustain the behavior.”213 
A recurrent theme in the appellate cases discussed in this Article arises 
from the courts’ use of the Rowley standard: IDEA ensures an education 
sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.214  
All of these cases were decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Endrew F., which arguably adds enhanced language that may raise the 
standard and could inform the next round of cases concentrating on the FBA 
or BIP.  It can be argued that the Supreme Court’s addition of the language 
“appropriate in light of [the child’s] circumstances” may work in favor of 
students in cases where serious behavior is a critical issue in the case.215  But 
this view could be misplaced in that the FBA and BIP are only required under 
IDEA if the district seeks to implement (or has implemented) a change of 
placement of greater than ten days and the district (or IEP team including the 
parents) found the behavior was a manifestation of the student’s disability.  
This leaves a gap that swallows the arguably enhanced Endrew F. standard. 
B. A Model for Restructuring the Behavior Provisions 
Congress last reauthorized the IDEA in 2004.216  Typically, the statute 
would have been considered by Congress again sometime around 2011.  But 
that did not happen, and as of 2018, there seems to be no push for Congress 
to do so in the near future.  However, Congress could draw from California’s 
history or New York’s current law to easily make needed changes.  The 
sections of California’s Hughes Bill dealing with behavior, and the bulk of 
corresponding regulations—both repealed effective July 1, 2013—offered 
more than sufficient detail for an effective approach to dealing with serious 
behaviors in the school setting.217  Current New York law (the most 
                                                          
 213. Dieterich & Villani supra note 17 at 211. 
 214. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
200 (1982). 
 215.  Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 
1002 (2017). 
 216. See 20 U.S.C. § 1402 (2004). 
 217. Perhaps the California regulations went a bit too far in detailing every step of the 
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expansive among the states) includes sufficient detail for the IEP team to act 
with mutual understanding of the legal requirements, without going as far as 
California did prior to the repeal of the bill.  Realistically, utilizing the 
current New York language or previous California language to craft new 
behavior provisions in IDEA would eliminate much of the confusion for 
parents and teachers. 
New language can and should be added to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414 and 1415.  
A model statutory provision should include these elements: identification of 
when and which type of student behavior triggers the provisions; a structure 
for the functional behavioral assessment that includes data gathering by 
trained personnel, review and utilization of the data by the IEP team when 
crafting the BIP; and finally, a BIP that is individualized.  The BIP should 
focus on positive behavioral interventions, include provisions for regular 
data collection and review of progress by school staff and the IEP team, and 
require adjustments as indicated by the student’s progress or lack thereof.  
Then and only then will IDEA truly include students with impactful 
behaviors in its guarantee of a free appropriate public education. 
C. Functional Behavioral Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans 
It is extremely unlikely that Congress would reach as far as California’s 
repealed provisions, and that is unfortunate for a number of reasons.  Chief 
among them is California’s Functional Analysis Assessment (FAA)—which 
was far more detailed in scope than the federal FBA.  For example, the FAA 
must have been “conducted by, or under the supervision of, a person who 
has documented training in behavior analysis with an emphasis on positive 
behavioral interventions.”218  The regulations required the IEP team to 
conduct the FAA “after the individualized education program team finds that 
instructional/behavioral approaches specified in the student’s individualized 
education program have been ineffective.”219  Once there was real cause for 
concern about effectiveness, the district had to bring onto the team a 
behavioral intervention case manager (BICM), a professional with 
specialized training who was proficient in systematically dealing with 
negative behaviors.  Such a manager must have “documented training in 
behavior analysis including positive behavioral intervention(s), qualified 
                                                          
process for what the FBA (called a “Functional Analysis Assessment” in the statute) and 
a BIP required.  Nevertheless, adherence to the regulations in large part provided not 
only clear guidance for school districts, but also a process based on best practices.  See 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56341 (2013). 
 218. CAL. CODE REGS. Title 5, § 3052 (2012) (repealed 2013). 
 219. Id. 
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personnel knowledgeable of the student’s health needs, and others . . . “220  
Anecdotal reports suggests that the BICM was welcomed both by parents 
and the school team.  Without such an expert in behavior, even well-
intentioned team members could easily flounder in the behavioral language. 
However, the best part of California’s former law rested in the 
understanding that a BIP is only as effective as the FAAis well done.221  
Thus, California had very specific requirements for the FAA as well: 
“[s]ystematic observation of the occurrence of the targeted behavior” with 
frequency, duration and intensity;222 identification of the “immediate 
antecedent events,”223 “observation and analysis of the consequences 
following the display of the behavior,”224 and an “[e]cological analysis of the 
settings in which the behavior occurs most frequently.”225  The analysis also 
must include a review of health and medical records. 
California’s regulations required a written report for the FAA—something 
that seems obvious, but that federal law does not require of its FBA.  The 
report was to include a description of the nature and severity of the targeted 
behavior, incorporating baseline data; analysis of antecedents and 
consequences; the rate of such behaviors; and recommendations for the IEP 
team.226  The California regulations left nothing to chance, including periodic 
evaluation for effectiveness.  As with the FAA and the report, the regulations 
required the evaluation determination to be detailed, factual, and 
exceptionally specific. 
New York, as discussed earlier in this Article, requires specificity for the 
identification of the behavior, collection of data, analysis of data, review of 
contextual factors, and “formulation of a hypothesis” and “probable 
                                                          
 220. See § 3052(a)(1). 
 221. California law differentiated its FAA from the federal law’s FBA.  In fact, the 
FBA language is so minimal that it is not a reach to say that it leaves virtually no direction 
for a motivated IEP team.  That cannot be said of the FAA language.  In fact, many 
school districts objected to the FAA because it was so specific and the requirements so 
strenuous.  While that is understandable, especially in light of declining public school 
budgets, the FBA language nevertheless created a system with no clear requirements.  It 
is hard to believe that approach is better for students or even districts; eventually—and 
often quickly—the poorly drafted FBA became the backbone of a BIP that could not and 
would not work well, which helps no one.  See id. 
 222. CAL. CODE REGS. Title 5, § 3052(b)(1)(A) (2012) (repealed 2013). 
 223. Id. § 3052(b)(1)(B). 
 224. Id. § 3052(b)(1)(C). 
 225. Id. § 3052(b)(1)(D). 
 226. See id. § 3052(b)(2). 
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consequences.”227  That specificity creates a structure for the FBA upon 
which the IEP team may rely when developing the BIP. If Congress 
incorporates the language of New York’s statute and regulations, it would 
go a long way toward a more workable process. 
In an era in which the federal government is moving to deregulate many 
industries—education among them—it is not realistic to expect significant 
movement toward more requirements under the IDEA.  However, this 
difficult area of behavior may be one opportunity for school districts and 
parents of children with disabilities to work together to clarify the actual 
legal requirements by adding, at the very least, clarifying language to the 
IDEA or through new regulations.  Guidance on the basic requirements for 
a legally sound FBA and the process to create a workable BIP need not be 
onerous, but could more likely assure that the promise of the IDEA is met 
for students with difficult behaviors as well as other students. 
 
                                                          
 227. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Title 8 § 200.1(r) (2018). 
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